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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN RE
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON,
Case No. 880448
Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal seeking review by the Supreme Court
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations
of Discipline of the Board of Bar Commissioners of the Utah State
Bar finding unprofessional conduct on behalf of the above named
attorney, Benjamin P. Knowlton. The Recomendation of Discipline
was that the Attorney be suspended from the practice of law for
six months, five months which would be stayed upon the conditions
that the attorney (1)
thirty (30) days and (2)

spend a period of actual suspension of
pay to the complainant Karen Lehmberg

Trujillo the sum of $4,995,95 within said period of suspension.
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by Article VIII Section
4, Utah Constitution and Rule 14, Procedures of Discipline of the
Utah State Bar.

1

STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I: THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ATTORNEYS CONDUCT VIOLATED THE REVISED RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE
BAR.
POINT II:

UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ATTORNEYS CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISHONEST AND
INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING.

POINT III:

THAT THE RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE IS UNDULY
HARSH AND INAPPROPRIATE.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Benjamin P. Knowlton

is an attorney

practice law in the State of Utah and has been

licenced to

since 1981.

In

addition, he has been licenced to practice law in the State of
California since 1980. Transcript of hearing, page 136.
Mr, Knowlton had known a Mr. Ellis Lehmberg more than
twenty (20) years prior to the claims involved herein, which
covered the period from 1982 to 1984.

He was a close friend with

both Mr. Ellis Lehmberg and Mr. Lehmbergs former wife, Karen
Basso Trujillo. Tr. H. 137, 151, hereinafter Ms. Trujillo.

Mr.

Knowlton had represented Mr. Lehmberg on numerous legal matters
both civil and criminal. Tr. H. 137.

He was retained by Mr.

Lehmberg to assist in the sale of a home on behalf of Ellis
Lehmberg, including various liens which were attached to the
home.

At that time Mr. Lehmberg owed Mr. Knowlton, in addition

to the monies paid in connection with the sale of the house,
substantial monies for attorneys fees.

These amounts were

estimated to be between $4,000.00 and $7,000.00 by Mr. Lehmberg,
Tr. H page 78, and approximately $7,550.00 by Mr. Knowlton. Tr. H
2

page 181.
Mr. Lehmberg and his wife owned a house during the
course of their marriage. Ms. Trujillo quit- claimed her interest
in the house to her parents, the Bassos and Mr. Lehmberg prior to
the initiation of the Divorce proceeding in this case. Tr, H page
41.

On behalf

of Mr. Lehmberg, Mr. Knowlton

expended

considerable time and effort dealing with judgement creditors on
the property and getting them to take less than the full amount
of their judgement in full satisfaction of their claims.

In

addition, he was able to arrange the sale of the house which
resulted in a net return over and above the payment of the
judgement and expenses and attorneys fees for Mr. Knowlton for
his efforts in the sale of the house.

Ultimately, a check was

issued to Mr. Knowlton as Trustee for Mr. Lehmberg and Henry and
Elaine Basso in the amount of $5,599.95. Tr. H 142-4, Findings of
Fact, numbers 1 and 2.
Ellis Lehmberg and his wife Karen separated and a
divorce was initiated in the spring of 1982. As part of that, an
Order to Show Cause was brought by Ms. Trujillo and various
hearings held before the Court on that Order to Show Cause that
ultimately resulted in

the issuance of a Stipulation Order (sic)

dated the 8th day of September, 1982, by Judge Uno.
recited
"That the monies held in Trust by
Mr. Benjamin P. Knowlton, Attorney at Law,
on behalf of both of the parties, shall
continue to be so held in Trust, and that
both parties are hereby restrained from
disposing of said Trust Funds, except as
3

That Order

agreed to by both parties and their Counsel."
At the hearing when Mr. Knowlton was in attendance, the issue was
addressed as to the money in his account.

Mr. Mitsunaga, Ms.

Trujillo's attorney, testified that Mr. Knowlton acknowledged
that he would hold the money in Trust pending final adjudication
of the case Tr. H. page 14.

Mr Knowlton testified that he

recalled the Judge asking him if he was holding any funds in
Trust, to which he replied yes, and he replied yes to a question
about making some of the funds available to repair Ms. Trujillo's
car. Tr. H. 145-6.

Counsel For Mr. Lehmberg at that hearing, Mr.

Thorn Roberts, recalled that Mr. Knowlton acknowledged that he had
the monies but that no Order was made directing Mr. Knowlton to
do anything concerning the monies Tr. H at page 116-7.
On or about January 25th 1983, the Lehmberg's divorce
trial was held before Judge Judith Billings.

The Court indicated

that she was going to award the monies from the sale of the
house, in the possession of Mr. Knowlton, to Ms. Trujillo.

That

fact was conveyed to Mr. Knowlton by Ms. Trujillo's attorney on
January 25, or 26th 1983.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law were initially signed by Judge Billings on February 5th,
19 8 3 without them having been properly prepared and forwarded
onto Counsel.

Ultimately, amended Findings and Conclusions were

entered April of 1983.

Record at 150.

Mr. Mitsunaga as Ms. trujillo's attorney, delivered a
letter to Mr. Knowlton on January 26, 1983, the day following the
divorce, demanding the monies which he held.
4

Record at 77.

Mr.

Knowlton took that letter and contacted D. Aaron Stanton, an
attorney at his office with regard to obtaining his monies from
the funds held in Trust.

Testimony D, Aaron Stanton, Tr. H page

71 Mr. Stanton advised Mr Knowlton that he had a legal lien on
the money for his fees, and was therefore entitled to it.
page 76.

Tr. H.

Mr Knowlton then contacted the attorney for Ellis

Lehmberg, Mr Thom D. Roberts, and asserted the lien and claims to
the money.

By letter dated January 27th 1983, Ellis Lehmberg's

attorney advised him of the claim by Mr. Knowlton to the specific
proceeds. Record at 66.

Tr. H page 133.

Mr Knowlton never paid to Ms. Trujillo the monies which
he had held in his account.
client Mr. Lehmberg

Based upon his fees owing from his

, his possession and assertion of the

attorneys lien over the proceeds, he withdrew the funds from his
account.

Tr, H page 147.

In August and September

of 1983 Mr.

Knowlton attempted to settle the claim with Ms. Trujillo by
payment of some monies based upon Mr. Knowlton's sense of
justice, Tr. H. 151-2.
initiated.

That was refused by Ms. Lehmberg and suit

That suit, Lehmberg v. Knowlton Third District Court,

Civil No. D82-1770 ultimately resulted in judgement for the
plaintiff as against the defendant.

However, the matter was

decided while attorney Knowlton was out of the State believing
the case would be continued. Tr. H. at page 158.

Further, the

Findings of Fact by Judge Conder in that case purported to adopt
a finding from the divorce, which was not a finding with regard
to the status of the monies.

See Finding of Fact Number 7 and
5

record at 133.
After Karen Trujillo gained a judgement against Mr.
Knowlton and payments were not immediately forthcoming, the
disciplinary process was begun in earnest.

Other than the

present action, Mr. Knowlton has had no Bar Action or complaints
sustained against him.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ATTORNEYS CONDUCT VIOLATED THE REVISED RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR.

The Bar in essence treated this case as Mr. Knowlton
stealing monies out of his Trust Account which belonged to his
client, without any basis to do so.

However, Mrs. Trujillo

was

not his client, the individuals entitled to the proceed from the
sale of the house, Ellis Lehmberg and the Bassos,

have never

complained and Mr. Knowlton took all actions necessary to receive
the monies as fees prior to Mrs. Trujillo

having interest in

them.
POINT II

THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ATTORNEY'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISHONESTY AND
INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING.

Mr. Knowlton was concerned about the treatment of monies
which he was holding in an account which he referred to as a
Trust Account.

He had claims for attorneys fees owing from a

client who had the major legal right to said monies.

After

seeking advise of Counsel and prior to the monies legally being
converted

to the beneficial interest of any other party, he
6

exercised
monies.

self help and asserted an Attorneys lien and took the
Such actions negate any dishonesty or intentional wrong

do ing on be ha, 1 i of M r: • Know 1 to n.

POINT III

THAT THE RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE IS UNDULY HARSH
AND INAPPROPRIATE.

i s exce s s i ^ re J y h a r s h

The it: ecommendeci d i s cIp ] i ne

in

this

particular case, based upon Mr. Knowlton's lack of intentional
wrong doing and his efforts in ascertaining his
course

". f act,ion ,

appropriate

in addi tion, compared to other

sanctions

imposed, this sanction is excessive.

ARGUMENT
POINT I THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ATTORNEYS CONDUCT VIOLATED THE REVISED RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR.
It

i". lli'-> Bar's position essentially

that Mr. Knowlton

stole money out of his Trust Account which beloi igeci to ei tl: lei a
client or someone that he a Fiduciary Trust relationship with,
that person being Ms. Trujillo.

It Is Attorney's position that

the Bar is misapplying the facts, and the conclusions to be drawn
from the facts, and misinterpreting the disciplinary process.
From Attorney Knowlton's point of view, this was a situation
where he

fae

J o n g e d t o h :i s

Client Ellis Lehmberg with potential n^ht.s in another pair of
individuals, Henry and Elaine Basse
in e x c e s s

r« Knowlton was owed money
11: i e a c c o l 1 n t £ o r

7

attorney's fees for service previously rendered to Mr. Lehmberg.
He contacted an attorney with regard to the manner in which he
could take those funds, and was advised by the attorney that he
consulted, Mr. D. Aaron Stanton, that he had an attorney's lien
and need

take no further action to perfect the lien and that he

was therefore entitled

to the monies.

as and toward his attorneys fees.

He then took the monies

Subsequent to that a third

party, in the context of a civil proceeding to which Mr. Knowlton
was not a party, received an award that as between her and Mr.
Knowlton client, she was entitled to any interest which may then
be existing in and to those monies.

That third person sought

relief against Mr. Knowlton in the lawsuit between her and Mr.
Knowlton client, which was denied on the basis that there was no
outstanding Order effecting Mr. Knowlton. (See Order on Hearings
signed by Judge Croft, record at 157.)

This third party then

filed suit against Mr. Knowlton which, due to a comedy of errors,
resulted in a trial where Mr. Knowlton was not present and could
not present his defense, resulting in a judgement against him,
which

judgement had not been satisfied.

Now, the Bar is

attempting, as a part of its disciplinary processes, to compel
him to satisfy the vast majority of that Judgement.
The Bar takes the position that at a hearing on June
19, 1982, attorney Knowlton somehow, by acknowledging existence
of certain monies in his account, thereby became obligated, in
that a relationship was created between him and Ms. Trujillo,
with respect to those funds.

However, the basis of that
8

relationship is never specified,

The District Court obviously

found that there was none created in context of the suit, because
•. ...:•! - - •
Knowltor

-

. •• :

~

.-••• wrought against Mr.

Furthe: , !-: Trujil .o a:,,, ;,•.. attorney, Mr. Mitsunaga

never testified as to any agreement of Trust or directions which
they expressed or requ i red of I ir

Know] ton any time prior to the

initiation of their lawsuit.
The Bar further takes the position and states
posit

t piir s iia n t

"succeeded

I : v orce D e c r e e M s .

t • : 1:

the

Trujillo

le interest of El^is Lehmberg in said Trust funds"

and that Mr. Knowlton was therefore obligated to pay all such
mo n i e s a s 1 I e h a d 1 : o h e r ,

Ho we ve r, this ignores the fact that

prior to entry of the Decree - the time whe;. .-.-s.

:uiillo

actually obtained the right to Ellis Lehmberg's claims to the
mon i es - M:i :

Knowlton had contacted an attorney, asserted a

lawyers lien and the right to self help o /er f„ht- monies
extinguished Mr. Lehmbergs

and

interest in and to said m o n i e s .

Therefore, when the Divorce Decree granted to Ms. Trujillo all of
Mr.

Lehmbergs interest in and

to said

. Les

there

was no

interest left at that time.
Attorney Knowlton views this as a claim by a third
party

-* i. \ . .

\ 7 i 11: 1 a c o m m e r c i a 1 11: a n s a c t i o 1 1, a rid no t w i 1: h

his ethical obligations and duties in connection with the conduct
of his practice,
McCune,

stated in In Re Disciplinary Action of
:al: 1 (] 9 86 ) J this Court stated

705-6:
9

at :. pages

The disciplinary procedures of the Court and Bar are
not intended to serve as an alternative means of
dispute resolution for third persons who have monetary
disputes with attorneys.
The practice of law not
infrequently leads to commercial disputes that can and
should be resolved in the civil C o u r t s .
The
disciplinary rules of the Bar are designed to assure
that lawyers handle their professional affairs with
great integrity and competence. Those rules are not
designed to allow those who have nonprofessional
disputes to invoke the spectre of a disciplinary action
simply as added leverage in trying to settle a business
dispute with an attorney.
The instant case, however, is morr than a business
dispute.
George McCune received monies from his
clients to pay debts incurred in handling their legal
affairs. He held the money in a fiduciary capacity
with the understanding that it was for a specific
purpose. He then failed to pay it to those to whom it
rightfully belonged.
All this was done in his
professional capacity and in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and of fundamental standards of
honesty.
The present case lacks all of the indica of fiduciary duties and
express direction with regard to the monies.
corpus

of money

being

held

by

What you have is a

Mr. Knowlton, with

the

beneficiaries of that money to be Mr. Knowlton's client Mr.
Lehmberg and Henry and Elaine Basso.

Mr Knowlton, being owed

monied for attorneys fees, engaged in self help to collect his
fees and received those monies.

The beneficiaries of those

monies, Mr. Lehmberg and the Basso's, have never complained.

Ms.

Trujillo claims those monies through Mr. Lehmberg, but she
obtained her right to them after Mr. Knowlton had received them
and claimed them as his own.
But for the civil judgement against Mr. Knowlton in
favor of Ms. Trujillo, it should be clear that Ms. Trujillo
should proceed in the divorce case to get her former husband to
10

pay the value of the monies that she was awarded, which monies
had been used for Mr. Lehmberg's purposes and payment of his
a 1 1 o i: II e y £ e e s

T1 11 i s

s In e c o u 1 d s e e k 1: o Mo d I £ y t h e I) e c i: e e o £

D i v o r c e to r e q u i r e M r , L e h m b e r g to pay her the actual values of
t h e m o n i e s , since Mi

^ehmberg had conveyed t h o s e for a good and

v a il i J, a b 1 e c o n s i d e

. on ,

A 11 h o \ i g I: i 1 ! s

T i: u j i 3 ] o in i g h t b e

considered an innocent and injured p a r t y , that is b e c a u s e she d i d
not receive th e appropriated share o: her
h e i: h i I s b a n d ,

1 1 it: K

v -

innocent injured party i;

> u ] ci -

marital state from

: a i: 1 y fa e c o n s j d e r e d a n

.r,ar. he w i l l have to repay monies w h i c h

he has received from a clierv: w h i c h m o n i e s w e r e

in p a y m e n t o f

right £ i i 1 a 11 o r n e y s f e e s p r e v j <: »i i s 1 y e a r n e d.
This matter has to do with the nature of the commercial
collection

of preexisting debts among various

nioni es , not w:i th regard to Mr

Know •

claimants

to

ixiiict as an attorney.

Therefore, the finding and conclusion "...ct Mr. Knowlton engaged
in conduct in violation of tille Revised Rules of

Professional

Conduct is j i I error
POINT II

THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ATTORNEY'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISHONESTY A N D
INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING.

The

Utah bar has taken the position that Attorney

KnowJ ton

i i I essence

sto 1 e ' these monies £roin Kar en Ti: uj i 1 1 o .

T h e i r second C o n c l u s i o n o n law number 3 is that the taking of t h e
monies

constituted

a

""" conversion" , and the Aggravation

Recommendation of Di scipline indicates that takim:
constitutes

.

, ;.es

"specific intent and knowing conversion of
11

said

:

monies,"indicating a specific intent to engage in wrongful
conduct, knowing it is wrong.

It is attorney Knowlton's position

that those conclusions are factually wrong as well as ignoring
critical legal elements.
As noted above Ms. Trujillofs rights to the monies only
matured into reality upon the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
Prior to that time, Mr. Knowlton

exercised dominion over those

monies as well as his claimed attorneys lien.

There was no other

contractual or other basis for imposing a Trust relation on Mr.
Knowlton with respect to Ms. Trujillo.

Therefor, since all

actions necessary for Mr. Knowlton to own the monies had been
accomplished prior to Ms. Trujillo having any rights to the
monies, his action were not in derogation of any

his duties to

her or her rights to existing monies.
A factual determination of this specific intent to
engage in wrongful conduct is also problematical based upon the
undisputed evidence with regard to Mr. Knowlton's conduct.
is no doubt that he was owed substantial monies

There

from Mr.

Lehmberg, probably in excess of the total amount in his account.
Further, prior to his taking the monies, he obtained independent
Counsel to review the situation and to advise him,

Mr. D. Aaron

Stanton who testified at the trial on the complaint. Tr, H. at
70-77. And further, prior the entry of the Decree - the time when
Ms. Trujillo1s interest perfected and attached the monies - Mr.
Knowlton formally gave notice of his assertion of his lawyers
lien and his claim to those specific funds to Mr. Lehmberg's
12

attorney, and thereby M r . Lehmberg.

See Letter of Lehmberg's

attorney, r ecord at 63
Based upon the claim of right ^f M r , Knowlton, his
seeking independent Counsel advise, following that advise, and
g I v I n g p r o p e r n o t i c e t o t h e i n t e r e s t e <:i p a r t i e s , i s d i f £ i c u ] t t o
sustain a finding of dishonesty or specific intent to engage in
wrongful conduct.

It is further difficult to believe that said

acts woii 1 ci a t 1 ea s t co n s t i 11 11 e " ini 11 gat ion" i n co n n e c 11 o i I w 11 h
the Recommendation of Discipline,

Thus,

it is c l e a r t h a t t h e

Recomendation of Discipline, based upon an incorrect Finding of
i

Disci:.;.
POINT .

;

. . ^xcessi^ « e,

THAT THE RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE IS UNDULY HARSH
AND INAPPROPRIATE.

This point concerns two related concepts in connection
with the recommended discipline.

As noted, recommendation

was

that attorney Ki lowlton be suspended f< :o: a period of si :; : months,
five months to be stayed upon doing 30 day actual suspension and
restitution

of

$5,000,00

to M s . T r u j i l l o .

It is

attorney

Know] toi I 's claim that discipline is excessive based upon (1) the
particulars of this case, (2) as well as in relationship to other
disciplinary proceedings before this Court.
A 3 i s i:e £ 1 ected i n the transci:ipt o£ the Proceedings
with regard to the Recommendation of Discipline, a
was entered into concerning that proposed discipline.
I J d y e 12 Tr an s c 11 p L UJ Proceed unj L. , f1 L

13

As stated

K: i o w i t o n s Counsel

stipulated to the appropriateness of the recommended
if

Stipulation

discipline

...(Y)our finding of violation of dishonesty
by the conversion was based upon actual evil
or improper intent on Mr. Knowlton's behalf,
if it was actual bad faith in terms of taking
the money, then an appropriate sanction would be...
It is clear that such is not what we are dealing with here.
noted by

As

Ms. Summner, at page 12, that did not appear to be the

concern of the hearing panel although that is ultimately the
discipline they imposed.

The Stipulation was if there were

knowing and intentional theft of monies by Mr. Knowlton which he
knew belonged to someone else and that he had no right to, then
the discipline was appropiate

Such is clearly not the case here.

As noted previously, Mr. Knowlton sought and obtained
• advise by independent Counsel as to the propriety of taking the
money, which advise he followed.

Further, he gave notice to his

client's attorney, and those initially entitled to the monies
have never complained.

It should be clear that such facts,

basically undisputed, would at least be in mitigation of any
violation, although the Bar found that they did not find them as
mitigation.

Thus, the discipline imposed should be far less than

that, based upon Mr. Knowlton's claim of right to the monies, and
his actions.
Assuming that the actions of Mr. Knowlton with regard
to these monies were improper, the question is what should have
Mr. Knowlton have done with regard to his handling of these
monies, other than the absolute standard of not taking them. Mr.
Knowlton

consulted with other attorneys about the matter,

including hiring one to render a specific opinion, which Mr.
14

Knowlton followed.
acti ons 1

1|!

""

::;

He further gave notice of his li en and

' • ] i ent, as the person interested in the monies

which he hac a duty ai id ob 1 igation toward.

To i mpose such a

severe sanction as that here, based upon Mr:. Knowlton' s actions
-eking others

, would fail to follow the purpose and

reasons for the imposition of sanctions.
As stated in In Re Phil L. Hansen,

586 P.2d 413 (1970)

a t page 41 7:
" We note in our awareness that when there has been a
deviation from proper professional standards there
should be some appropriate penalty, not only for the
effect upon the attorney, but as a salutaury measure
for the benefit of the Bar and the public. Yet, there
are other matters of importance bearing on the proper
judgement herein. Disbarment of an attorney for a
period of one year, thus interrupting his practice and
depriving him of the means of livelihood, has a number
of serious effects upon him, his el ientele and those
dependent upon him."
In Re Phil L. Hansen cites for the above In Re Robert B. Hansen,
584 P.2d 805 (Utah 1978), which stated at page 806, in connection
with pun I shment:
Speaking in generality, it is to be realized that the
attainment of a profession usually represents, in
addition to the years of education devoted to that
purpose, the commitment of a lifetime to a man's career
and that therefore, the depravation of that privilege
is something which should not be done lightly, nor at
all unless the attorney is guilty of some culpable
wrong or there is some other serious matter to justify
that kind of surgery on his means of livelihood.
The recommendation by the Utah State Bar of a punishment is
advisory upon this Court.

••

n Re Phil Hansen, supra.

Further as stated in In Re Robert B. Hansen, supra, at page 807,
in discussing the reducing of the imposed discipline from the
15

recommended one year suspension to a public reprimand:
We have reviewed the foregoing matter in awareness of
our previous declarations of this Court that, though it
is the prerogative and responsibility of the Court to
make the findings and Orders in such matters, we will
nevertheless regard the findings and recommendations of
the commission as advisory, and will accord them some
degree of indulgence, and be inclined to act in
accordance therewith unless it appears the commission
has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, (footnotes
omitted.)
It is respectfully submitted that the recommendations with regard
to discipline here do not take into account all of the relevent
matters with regard to the conduct of Mr. Knowlton, the effect on
the parties, and the legal nature of the proceedings.

Further,

it fails to take into account the existence of extensive
mitigating

circumstances

circumstances.

and

finds

only

aggravating

Therefore, this Court should exercise it's

function and powers, reject the recommendations, and to the
extent discipline is imposed, impose at most a public reprimand.
It is further noted in the claim of attorney Knowlton
that the suspension as imposed is excessive even assuming all of
the claims of the Bar, based upon other discipline imposed.
noted above, in In Re Robert B. Hansen, the

As

Court found improper

conduct on behalf of that of Mr. Hansen in failing to properly
account and pay over monies admittedly belonging to a client,
collected on behalf of a client and co-mingled for a period of
years as well as improper statements made to the press and
individual jury investigation.

Discipline recommended was one

year suspension, reduced to a public reprimand.

In Re Phil

Hansen, supra, concerned charges clearly excessive fee and
16

defending an individual in a civil fraud suit, and during the
pendency of the suit, defending the plaintiff on a imrelated
r t reduced the r ecommended discipline n|:

criminal matter,.

one year disbarment and reduced it down to a requirement that the
attorney acknowledged that he breached his contract with his
client and i: ef ui id 1 ler fees

Ii 1 In Re Don Leroy Bybee, 6 2 9 P . 2d

423 (Utah 1981), the attorney violated his professional duties by
the

preparing

and

filing

represents •. .

.=•*

of

false

':.-:

bonds
•••

;

i nd

- • -: I = e

and prejudicial to the administration of justice, this
affirmed

the

suspend*- .

recommendation
t

-

making
.s>-^d:^g
Court

of the Bar that the lawyer be
montl is,

In In Re George McCune,

supra, t±~~ attorney received monies from his client to pay for
reporter fees and other expenses, and paid only a portion of
those monies ovei ami kept <i Mibstant u I amount tor hi- own use.
Despite Mr. McCunes contumacious conduct toward the disciplinary
process, this Court only affirmed the recommended discipline of
3 0 • :iai • s ai Id a requi rernent to p a y ov er

the m o n i e s

gi v e n to h i m

by

the client to those rightfully entitled to it and who the client
had directed that be paid.
The

recommend

di; ~», c I p ! i j i e w i t h r e g a r d to

attorney

Knowlton of six months, five months of which to be stayed, and
restitution of certain monies. Is greater than any of the above
mentioned

cases w 1 :i i ch 1 Ia1! > e

•••--.

: the last ten years.

Further, it is clear that the actions or the other attorneys i n
or at least in some of those cases is far more severe improper,
17

and aggravating than that engaged in by Mr. Knowlton.

Further,

this is the first and only sustained disciplinary action taken
against Mr. Knowlton in the eight years of his admission to
practice in the State of Utah, and nine years in the State of
California.

Therefore, on the basis of the previously imposed

discipline, of attorneys, that recommended by the Bar for Mr.
Knowlton is clearly excessive, unreasonable, and inappropriate.
Therefore, it is recommended that the discipline of Mr.
Knowlton, if any, be reduced to at most a public reprimand.
Further, this Court could make a direction to lawyers in the
future, not to engage in any type of self help in collecting of
fees, but to cheerfully decline to take monies belonging to a
client and in the Attorney's possession, return said monies to
the client and seek paymnet through

further

litigation,

judgement, and execution thereon against one's clients.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Utah
State Bar erred in its determination and conclusion that Mr.
Knowlton engaged in conduct in violation of the Revised Rules of
Professional

Conduct of the Utah State Bar, specific, Mr.

Knowlton engaged in conduct "involving dishonesty, conduct which
adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law", or conduct
which failed to avoid the "appearance of impropriety".

Further,

and at a minimum, the Utah State Bar erred in its assessment of
culpability with respect to the conduct of Mr. Knowlton and
recommended unreasonable and excessive discipline for the actions
18

of Mr Knowlton.

Thus, to the extent this Court finds conduct of

Mr. Knowlton in

violation of his ethics as an attorney, any

discipline imposed should be less than that recommended by the
Bar, and at most be a public reprimand.

DATED this

day of March, 1989.
ROBERTS & ROBERTS

BY.
Thorn D. Roberts
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of March,

1989, a true and correct original and four copies of the
foregoing Appellant's brief was delivered to Christine Burdick,
Bar Counsel, Attorney for the Utah State Bar, 645 South 200 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 postage prepaid
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OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
In Re:
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON
DOB: 05/12/44
Admitted: 04/30/81

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER AMENDING FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND RECOMMENDATION
OF DISCIPLINE
F-220

This matter having come on for hearing pursuant to
Respondent's Objections to Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendation on October 27, 1988, before a three-member
Panel of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar
and Respondent being represented by and through counsel,
Thorn Roberts, and Christine A. Burdick, Bar Counsel,
appearing and the Panel having heard arguments of counsel
and having made its recommendation to the Board of Bar
Commissioners at its meeting on October 28, 1988, and the
Board being fully advised in the premises, order and decrees
as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's Objections be
and they hereby are denied;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Stipulation of Counsel
to Amend Findings of Fact No. 12 be and it hereby is
accepted and said Finding of Fact shall read:
The Panel finds no violation of any ethical
standard by reason of the non-payment of the
judgment in Lehmberg vs. Knowlton, Third Judicial
District, Civil No. D82-1770, entered against
Respondent.

±

DATED this

day of fJpltCI^^Ly

, 1988.

Board of Commissioners

By:
Kent M. Kasting
President
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foregoing Order Amending Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

ORDER AFFIRMING
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND RECOMMENDATION
OF DISCIPLINE

In Re;
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON

Pursuant to Rule XII(d) of the Procedures of
Discipline, the Board has reviewed the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline of the
Disciplinary Hearing Panel.

It hereby affirms those

determinations, adopts them as its own, and incorporates
them by reference into this order.

DATED this

12

day of

YY)

1988,

By the Boarcr of
Bar Commissioners:

lAf^n

^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order was served on Thorn D. Roberts at 10
West 300 South #500, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101 and on

David Knowlton at 2910 Washington Boulevard #305, P.O.
Box 1379, Ogden, Utah
on this

/ff^day of

84401, Attorneys for Respondent,

1'HjXlU

, 1988.

^\\i

L.C JUL ^ . 11 YuTtTC
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V\oo V

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
In Re;
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
RECOMMENDATION OF
DISCIPLINE
F-220

This matter having come on for hearing pursuant to
notice on February 16, 1988, and continued for further
hearing on February 24, 1988, before a Hearing Panel of the
Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar
comprised of Dale R. Kent, Chairman, Joseph Gallegos and
Molly Sumner and the Respondent being present and
represented by counsel, Thorn D. Roberts and David Knowlton,
and the Utah State Bar being represented by Associate Bar
Counsel, Christine A. Burdick, and the Panel having
admitted certain exhibits marked P-l through P-ll and R-l
through R-9 and having taken testimony from Karen Trujillo,
Jimi Mitsunaga, Ellis Lehmberg and Respondent and the Panel
having heard arguments of counsel and being fully advised
in the premises, makes the following Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendation:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. ^Respondent was retained by Ellis Lehmberg to
assist in the sale of a home on behalf of Ellis Lehmberg
and Henry and Elaine Basso.

FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 1

ftDo S"

check made payable to him as trustee on behalf of Ellis
Lehmberg and Henry and R. Elaine Basso in the sum of
$5,599.95.
3.

On or about June 9, 1982, Respondent appeared

before Third District Court Judge Uno at which time
Respondent acknowledged receipt of said proceeds and agreed
to hold the money in trust pending the outcome of the
divorce between Ellis Lehmberg and Karen Lehmberg Trujillo.
4.

Respondent acknowledged releasing $600.00 for

payment of car repairs for Karen Lehmberg Trujillo1s
benefit per Judge Uno's order in the divorce action.
5.

On or about January 26, 1983, Attorney Jimi

Mitsunaga notified Respondent that the money being held by
Respondent in trust was awarded by the court to Karen
Lehmberg Trujillo.
6.

Subsequent to January 26, 1983, Respondent

understood that he continued to hold said monies in trust
as evidenced by his August and Spetember 1983 tender of
part of said monies to Jimi Mitsunaga on behalf of Karen
Lehmberg Trujillo in response to Jimi Mitsunaga1s demands
for payment.
7.

In addition to this Panelfs independent findings

of fact, the Panel incorporates in these Findings, Finding
No. 5 of Judge Croft's Findings of Fact in Lehmberg vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 2

y\oo £

Knowlton, Third Judicial District, Civil No. D82-1770,

wherein Judge Croft found that the monies held by
Respondent were held in trust.
8.

Respondent claimed that he had a personal right to

the monies based on an attorney's lien pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-51-54 for attorney's fees owing to him for
legal work performed for Ellis Lehmberg.
9.

For legal services rendered by Respondent for the

sale of the home, Respondent received attorney's fees in
the sum of $2,000.00 as reflected by the closing statement
of the sale of the property and which payment Respondent
acknowledged.
10.

Respondent did not establish by sufficient and

clear evidence the amount of the attorney's lien which he
claimed; all evidence with respect to the amount of
outstanding attorney's fees owed by Ellis Lehmberg was, at
best, speculative.
11•

Respondent never paid any of the monies held in

trust to Karen Trujillo but rather converted to his own use
the monies held in trust in the sum of $4,999.95.
12.

The Panel does not make any Findings with respect

to whether non-payment of the judgment in Lehmberg vs.
Knowlton, Third Judical District, Civil No. D82-1770,
entered against Respondent is a violation of the Code of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
Based on the foregoing Findings, the Panel makes the
following:

FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Upon the court's award of said monies to Karen

Lehmberg Trujillo, a trust relationship was established
between Respondent in favor of Karen Lehmberg, who by
virtue of the divorce decree succeeded to the interest of
Ellis Lehmberg in said trust funds.
2.

Utah Code Section 78-51-54 relating to attorney

liens is only applicable to proceeds directly acquired from
a cause of action in which an attorney represents the
party; Respondent's claim of attorney^ fee related to
legal services other than the legal services performed for
the sale of the home.
3.

A common law lien for attorney's fees does not

exist in the State of Utah.
3.

Respondent's couversion of those trust funds in

the sum of $4,999.95 constitutes a violation of the
following disciplinary rules:
a.

Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) engaging in conduct

involving dishonesty;
b.

Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(6) engaging in conduct

that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law; and
c.

Canon 9, DR 9-101 failing to avoid even the

appearance of impropriety.
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the
Panel makes -the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 4
lA

rtr\

&

RECOMMENDATION OF

DISCIPLINE

Aggravation:

1.

Because Respondent accepted the trust check as

trustee and acknowledged that he would hold such funds in
trust pending the outcome of the divorce action, his
failure to pay said monies to Karen Lehmberg Trujillo and
his conversion of said monies to his own use constitutes
specific intent and a knowing conversion of said monies.
Mitigation: None.
Respondent through his counsel and Associate Bar
Counsel, Christine A. Burdick, have stipulated to the
following recommendation of discipline; Respondent,
however, has not stipulated to any of the Findings of Fact
nor Conclusions of Law.

Consequently, the Panel makes the

following recommendation of discipline:
1.

Respondent shall be suspended from the practice of

law in the State of Utah for period of six (6) months with
five months stayed on the following conditions:
a.

Respondent be actually suspended from the

practice of law for a period of 30 days to begin within two
weeks of the entry of the Order of Discipline by the Utah
Supreme Court; and
b.

Respondent pay as and for restitution to

Karen Lehmberg Trujillo the sum of $4,999.95, said sum to
be paid prior to the conclusion of the six month period of
suspension-

FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 5

V\V O °(

S&tswsnaa^^^exnu^rM^€fS^trbali' State Bar for

all costs incurred in prosecuting these proceedings.
3.

In the event Respondent fails to comply with the

Order of Discipline and the payment of restitution, an
order to show cause shall issue ordering Respondent to
appear before this Hearing Panel to show cause why the
remaining five months of the suspension should not be
imposed.
DATED this

. 1988.

day of

Le R. Kent/ Chairman
Hearing Panel

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation of Discipline was mailed certified mail
return receipt requested to Thorn D. Roberts at 10 West 300
South #500, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, and David

Knowlton at 2910 Washington Boulevard #305, P.O. Box 1379,
Ogden, Utah

84401, Attorneys for Respondent, on this

day of

. 1988.

• y k)/>i<u .
FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 6
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Oirfc Supr*m« ciurf, Utah'

ROBERTS 6c ROBERTS
Attorney for Defendant
10 West 300 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-3550
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH
KAREN LEHMBERG,
Plaintiff,

: STIPULATION ORDER

vs

:

ELLIS HADERLIE LEHMBERG,

:

Defendant.

: Civil No. D82-1770

Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on regularly for
hearing on the 9th day of June, 1982, at the hour of 10:00 a.m.,
on the issue of ^hild support, and the Plaintiff being present
and represented by Mr. Jimi Mitsunaga, and the Defendant being
present and represented by John Russell, appearing on behalf of
[Thorn D. Roberts, this attorney of record, and the parties hereby
stipulate and agree as follows to wit:
1.

That the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the

sum of $120.00 per month, per child, a total of $240.00 per month
as and for temporary child support.

Said payments are to com-

mence in the month of June 1982 with $120.00 due on the 15th day
of June, 1982, and $120.00 due on the 30th day of June, 1982, and
the like days of the months thereafter.

It is hereby represented

that on said hearing date, the Defendant was unemployed.
2.

That the monies held in trust by Mr. Benjamin P.

Knowlton, Attorney at Law, on behalf of both of the parties, shall
continue to be so held in trust, and that both parties are hereby
restrained from dispossing of said trust funds, except as agreed
to by both parties and their Counsel.
DATED this 3 /

da

?

of

August, 1982.
ROBERTS & ROBERTS

ROBERTS & ROBERTS

<fp\ _

K t

ORDER
Based upon the above stipulation of the parties and
good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered that the Defendant
pay to the Plaintiff temporary child support of the sum of $120.00
per child, per month, totaling $240.00 per month, commencing
on the 15th day of June, 1982, in the amount of $120.00, the balance*
on the 30th day of June, 1982, and continued thereafter on like
days; and further, that the monies held in trust by Benjamin P.
Knowlton, Attorney at Law, be continued to be held in trust for
the above named parties, and that no withdrawl shall be made with
out the joint written request of both attorneys for the parties.
DATED this

&

day of AngTiW-, 1982.
BY THE COURT:

s£5%5fx

«(JJkM%^

<GL-^QZ-0"
Ju 8e Kaymond $Un

°'

ROBERTS & ROBERTS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
4 0 0 TEN BROADWAY BUILDING

-~

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH

January 26, 1983

84102

TELEPHONE (SO!) 3 2 2 - 3 5 5 1

Mr. Ben Knowlton
Attorney at Law
243 East 400 South, #100
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
Re:

Lehmberg vs. Lehmberg

Dear Mr. Knowlton:
Please be advised that the Lehmberg matter has been tried
and the Decree is now being prepared and that the Decree
will provide that the monies that you are holding in trust
for themf together with the interest accumulated thereonf
should be forwarded to my office for the benefit of Karen
Lehmberg pursuant to the Decree of Divorce.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Very truly yours,
/

Jimi Mi tsunaga
Attorney at Lav
JM/b

January 27, 1933

Ellis Lehmberg^^
8425 South 1^7 East
Sandy, Utah 84092
RE: Lehmberg v. Lehmberg
Dear Cheese,
Enclosed you will find the letter which I received from your
wife's attorney, and a copy of a proposed Assignment of Wages.
Please contact me with regard to the matters contained therein,
including the potential upcoming sale of your car.
Further this is to advise you that Ben Knowlton called me and
indicated that he is filing an Attorney's Lien against £he monies
held in his truut account. I am not sure of the effect this will
have on anything, bujr you should be advised of that.
Further with regard to the divorce, I have not yet received any
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or proposed Decree.
Upon my receipt of them I will forward them on to you.
Sincerely,
ROBERTS 6c ROBERTS

THOM D. P.OBERTS
TDR:cg
ends

(A-^n

id

JIMI MITSUNAGA
Attorney for the Plaintiff
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone:

K.

o:;- •

BY

^Zl^l^jd^

322-3551

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH
)

KAREN LEHMBERG,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

Civil No. D82-1770

ELLIS HADERLIE LEHMBERG,
Defendant.

)

The above matter came on for trial on the 25th day
of January, 1983, at the hour of 9 a.m., before the
Honorable Judith Billing, Judge, and the plaintiff
present and represented by Jimi Mitsunaga, and the
defendant present and represented by Thorn D. Roberts, and
it appearing that more than ninety days has lapsed since
the filing of the complaint and the plaintiff and
defendant having been duly sworn and testimony given and
exhibits received and the Court being advised of the
premises and good cause appearing, herewith enters the
foregoing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the parties are residents of Salt Lake

FlMI MITSUNAGA
ATTORNEY

AT

EAST S O U T H
KLT LAKE C I T Y .

LAW
TEMPLE|
UTAH

84102

Ann

\<~

\ i

County, State of Utah) and have been for more than three
months prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

The parties were married on the 27th day of May,

3.

That the defendant treated the plaintiff cruelly

1977.

causing her great mental distress and that the defendant
provided no financial support to the plaintiff and has
physically abused the plaintiff during the course of the
marriage causing her great physical and mental distress.
4.

That there are two children born as issue of the

marriage, Alexandria, born December 18, 1977, and
Brandisf born October 24, 1981. That said children are
in the custody of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is
a proper person to have the permanent care, custody and
control of the aforesaid minor children, subject to the
right of the defendant to visit with said children at
reasonable times and places.
5.

It is reasonable that the plaintiff receive the

household furniture and fixtures currently in her
possession as her sole and separate property, together
with the stereo and stereo stand and a television console
which is now in the defendant's possession, and it is
reasonable that the defendant deliver the aforesaid items
to the plaintiff forthwith.
6.

Further, it is reasonable that the defendant

receive as his sole and separate property the property in
JIM I MlTSUNAGA
ATTORNEY AT LAW
31 EAST SOUTH TEMPUEj
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
84102

ftOo

LL

^2

his possession,
7.

It is reasonable that the plaintiff receive as

her sole and separate property, the 1969 Mustang and that
the defendant receive as his sole and separate property,
the 1966 Blue Fairlane Ford automobile,
8,

That the plaintiff did have a family residence

prior to the date of this marriage and that upon the
marriage of the parties, the second mortgage was obtained
by the parties.

That the second mortgage was not paid

and that the house was sold and the net proceeds is
currently held by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, as trustee for
the parties, in the amount of Five Thousand Five Hundred
Ninety-nine dollars and ninety-five cents ($5,599.95),
plus interest, said amount having been obtained from the
sale of the residence.
That at the time of closing the monies in the
amount of Forty Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) was taken
out of the joint proceeds to pay the Department of
Recovery Services for the defendant's past due child
support due from a prior marriage.
It is reasonable that the entire amount held in
trust by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, together with the
interest accumulated therefrom, be awarded to the
plaintiff as her sole and separate property, free and
clear of any claims or right of the defendant.
9.
MI

MlTSUNAGA

nrORNEY AT L A W
CAST SOUTH TEMPLE J
T LAKE CITY. UTAH
04102

That the parties, during the course of the

marriage, incurred joint indebtedness to the following

named persons and that it is reasonable that the defendant
assume and pay the aforegoing creditors mentioned below
and to hold the plaintiff harmless from any claims
arising therefrom:
Dr. Joe Roberts
Dr. Gerald Snarr
Dr. Dallis VanWagoner
Primary Children's Hospital
Cottonwood Hospital
Dr. Morris Mariece Baker
Pathology Lab#
10.

It is reasonable that the defendant keep and

maintain the medical coverage for the benefit of the
minor children which he obtains through his employment.
11.

That the defendant earns approximately $800 to

$900.00 net take home pay per month, and the plaintiff
earns approximately $400 net take home pay per month.
12.

It is reasonable that the defendant pay to the

plaintiff the sum of $150.00 per month per child, totalling
$300.00 per month. Further, it is reasonable that the
defendant pay the sum of $50.00 per month as permanent
alimony until terminated by operation of law.
Further, it is reasonable that the aforesaid
payments commence on February 1, 1983, and that the.same
shall be made payable to the Clerk of the Court.
13.

That the defendant has failed to abide by the

temporary order providing for $240.00 per month for
temporary support and that the defendant has failed to
JlMI

MlTSUNAGA

ATTORNEY AT LAW
SI CAST SOUTH TEMPLE)
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84102

pay temporary support from October, 1982, to January of

1983, and that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
against the defendant in the sum of $$960.00.

It is

reasonable that so long as the defendant pays $100.00 per
month towards the back judgment heretofore entered, that
the plaintiff will be foreclosed from commencing any
proceedings to execute or collect this judgment.
14.

That it is reasonable that the defendant pay

to the plaintiff the sum of $500.00 as reasonable
attorney's fees and that a judgment in the aforesaid
amount be entered as against the defendant.
15.

The Court finds that due to the long

separation of the parties and the violent nature of the
relationship during the marriage and the lack of reconciliation possibilities that the divorce should be made
final upon entry.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now
makes its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the parties are entitled to a Decree of

Divorce, said decree to become final upon entry.
2.

That the plaintiff is awarded permanent care,

custody and control of the two minor children born as
issue of the marriage, Alexandria, born December 18,
1977, and Brandis, born October 24, 1981, subject to the
right of the defendant to visit with said children at
reasonable times and places.
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Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against
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the defendant in the sum of $960.00 for back child
support and so long as the defendant pays the $100.00 per
month towards the back judgment heretofore entered, that
the plaintiff will be foreclosed from any proceedings to
execute or collect this judgment.
4.

That defendant is entitled to the sum of

$150.00 per month per child, for a total of $300.00 per month
for support of the two minor children and $50.00 as permanent
alimony per month, until terminated by operation of law,
and shall commence on February 1, 1983, payable to the
Clerk of the Court.
5.

The plaintiff is entitled to receive the

household furniture and fixtures currently in her
possession as her sole and separate property, together
with the stereo and stereo stand and a television console
which is now in the defendant's possession, and the
the defendant deliver the aforesaid items to the
plaintiff forthwith.
6.

Defendant is entitled to receive as his sole and

separate property, the property in his possession.
7.

Plaintiff is entitled to, as her sole and

separate property, the 1969 Mustang and that the
defendant receive as his sole and separate property,
the 1966 Blue Fairlane Ford automobile.
8.

That the plaintiff did have a family residence

prior to the date of this marriage and that upon the
marriage of the parties, the second mortgage was obtained

J^OD

na
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by the parties.

That the second mortgage was not paid

and that the house was sold and the net proceeds is
currently held by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, as trustee for
the parties, in the amount of Five Thousand Five Hundred
Ninety-nine dollars and ninety-five cents ($5,599.95),
plus interest, said amount having been obtained from the
sale of the residence.
That at the time of closing the monies in the
amount of Forty Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) was taken
out of the joint proceeds to pay the Department of
Recovery Services for the defendant's past due child
support due from a prior marriage.
Plaintiff is entitled to the entire amount held in
trust by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, together with the
interest accumulated therefrom, as her sole and separate
property, free and clear of any claims or right of the
defendant thereon.
9.

That the parties, during the course of the

marriage, incurred joint indebtedness to the following
named persons and that the defendant is to assume
and pay the aforegoing creditors mentioned below
and to hold the plaintiff harmless from any claims
arising therefrom:
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Dr. Joe Roberts
D~r. Gerald Snarr
Dr. Dallis VanWagoner
Primary Children's Hospital
Cottonwood Hospital
Dr. Morris Ma^riece Baker
Pathology Lab.
10.

Defendant is to keep and maintain the medical

coverage for the benefit of the minor children which he

obtains through his employment.
11.

That the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in

the amount of $500.00 as reasonable attorney's fees and
that a judgment of $500.00 in the aforesaid amount be
entered as against the defendant.
DATED this J?_day of ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 9 8 3 .
BY THE COURT:

f

/rtL yft

AJi

GE JUDITH BILLING^. / A
A i I^ 6 I

Approved a s t o f o r m :

THOM D . ROBERTS

Attorney for the Defendant
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H. DSXON HiMDLEY

^

^

Deputy Ctork

FEB 8
U. D!X

JIMI MITSUNAGA
Attorney for the Plaintiff
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH
)

KAREN LEHMBERG,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,

)

vs.
)
ELLIS HADERLIE LEHMBERG,
Defendant.

)

Civil No. D82-1770
,
>,•«-,
$4/7 4 A//).$ . ^ . C 7 ..

The above matter came on for trial on the 25th day
of January, 1983, at the hour of 9 a.m., before the
Honorable Judith Billing, Judge, and the plaintiff
present and represented by Jimi Mitsunaga, and the
defendant present and represented by Thorn D. Roberts, and
it appearing that more than ninety days h a s lapsed since
the filing of the complaint and the plaintiff and
defendant having been duly sworn and testimony givan and
exhibits received and the Court being advised of the
premises and good cause appearing, and having entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED A N D DECREED
•ITSUNACA
EY A T

LAW

SOUTH TEMPLE}
E CITY. UTAH
4102

1.

That the parties are awarded a Decree of Divorce,

II

said Decree to become final upon entry.

2.

Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care,

custody and control of the two minor children born as
issue of the marriage, Alexandria, born December 18,
1977, and Brandis, born October 24, 1981, subject to the
right of the defendant to visit with said children at
reasonable times and places.
3.

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against

the defendant in the sum of $960.00 for back child
support and so long as the defendant pays the $100.00 per
month towards the back judgment heretofore entered, that
the plaintiff will be foreclosed from any proceedings to
execute or collect this judgment.
4.

That defendant is awarded the sum of $150.00

per month per child, for a total of $300.00 per month
for support of the two minor children and $50.00 as permanent alimony per month until terminated by operation of
law, and shall commence on February 1, 1983, payable to
the Clerk of the Court.
5.

The plaintiff is awarded to receive the

household furniture and fixtures currently in her
possession as her sole and separate property, together
with the stereo and stereo stand and a television console
which is now in the defendants possession, and the
defendant is to deliver the aforesaid items to the

J l M I MXTSUNAGA
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731 EAST SOUTH TEMPl_£
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH

aintiff forthwith.

6.

The defendant is awarded as his sole and

separate property, the property in his possession.
7.

Plaintiff is awarded, as her sole and

separate property, the 1969 Mustang and that the
defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property,
the 1966 Blue Fairlane Ford automobile.
8.

That the plaintiff did have a family residence

prior to the date of this marriage and that upon the
marriage of the parties, the second mortgage was obtained
by the parties.

That the second mortgage was not paid

and that the house was sold and the net proceeds is
currently held by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, as trustee for
the parties, in the amount of Five Thousand Five Hundred
Ninety-nine dollars and ninety-five cents ($5,599.95),
plus interest, said amount having been obtained from the
sale of the residence.
That at the time of closing the monies in the
amount of Forty Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) was taken
out of the joint proceeds to pay the Department of
Recovery Services for the defendant's past due child
support due from a prior marriage.
Plaintiff is awarded to the entire amount held in
trust by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, together with the
interest accumulated therefrom, as her sole and separate
property, free and clear of any claims or right of the
defendant thereon.
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9.

That the parties, during the course of the

marriage, incurred joint indebtedness to the following
named persons and that the defendant is to assume
and pay the aforegoing creditors mentioned below
and to hold the plaintiff harmless from any claims
arising therefrom:
Dr. Joe Roberts
Dr. Gerald Snarr
Dr. Dallis VanWagoner
Primary Children's Hospital
Cottonwood Hospital
Dr. Morris Mariece Baker
Pathology Lab.
10.

Defendant is ordered to keep and maintain the

medical coverage for the benefit of the minor children
which he obtains through his employment.
11.

That the plaintiff is awarded to a judgment in

the amount of $500.00 against the defendant as reasonable
attorney's fees.
DATED this £_day of JairtrcTryV #983.
BY THE COURT:
JUDG

~

IITH BILLING
v

t

:

% \j

i

Approved as to form:
THOM D. ROBERTS
Attorney for the Defendant
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Attorney for the Plaintiffy'/ X
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH
)

KAREN LEHMBERG,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AMENDING DECREE
OF DIVORCE
)

vs.

Civil No. D82-1770
)

ELLIS HADERLIE LEHMBERG,
Defendant.
)

C\nu\

^

The Defendant's motion to Amend Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce came on for
hearing on the 5th day of April, 1983, before the
Honorable Judith Billings, Judge, and the Plaintiff
represented by Jim Mitsunaga, Esquire, and Defendant
represented by Thorn D. Roberts, Esquire, and the Court
having heard the arguments of counsel and good cause
appearing, It Is Hereby Ordered that the Defendant's
Motion be and is hereby denied, except that Paragraph 8
of the Divorce Decree should be amended to include the
following order:
That the Plaintiff shall assume and pay the
indebtedness due to Plaintiff's parents and shall hold

the Defendant harmless from any claims arising thereform.
rtfa-^ day of -ftfSll, 1983.
DATED t hlis
i d2Si2l

Approved as to torm:

Thorn. D. Roberts
Attorney for Defendant

JlMI MlTSUNAGA
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C'-jpify Cterk

JIHI MITSUNAGA
Attorney for the Plaintiff
731 Eaat South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
\

Telephone*

Ax

¥

ISSUED

322-3551

IH THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH
)
KAREN LEHMBERG,
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff,

)

V8.

)
ELLIS HADERLIE LEHHBERG,
Defendant.

C i v i l No. D82-1770

)

BASED UPON the affidavit of the plaintiff and good
cause appearing, it iff hereby ordered that Ben Knowlton,
Attorney at Law, and Ellis Haderlie Lehmberg, the defendant,
are ordered to appear before Commissioner Sandra S. Pueler,
in Courtroom IC, in the Salt Lake City Courts Building
at 240 East 400 South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the
2lLtLday

of

August

, 1983, at the hour of

2 p .m., then

and there to show caise, if any Ben Knowlton, Attorney at Law,
has, why the amount of Five Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine
Dollars and ninety-five cents ($5,599.95), with interest thereon from the date of divorce should not be paid to the plaintiff,
and for Ellis Haderlie Lehrr.be rg, the defendant, why a judgnent
in the amount of 1, 057. /0

amount for child support arrearage

should not be entered against him, and further, why he should
not

be held in contempt of Court.
DATED this 22 day of July, 1983.
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CASE NO:

3L-/TI0

Q

Type of hearing: Div..
Annul..
Present: Pltf,.
Deft._
P.Atty: Q / ^ i / Yhijh<u^r\n
atc^j
'
D. Atty: ^<]h.cn\j
iQ. L& /</ V / J * ~
Sworn & Examined: ^(Ctt^
<T\IC-CU{*\SL
Deft: U'i d^c A.
Pltf:.
L
Others:

QSC. ^piljk^Ji
Other.
Supp. Order.
Stipulation
Summons.
Publication
Waiver
D Default of Pltf/Deft Entered
^
Date:
*%.pL
?
/y*3
J^h/AasnL
M
t^^ii
y^n^/A/^Ci udge:
Clerk
Reporter:
Bailiff:
c^ Wta
r.b^

?-

T

ORDERS:
D Custody Evaluation Ordered
•
Visitation Rights

D

Custody Awarded To

•
•
D

Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $
x
Per Month/Year
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:.

•
•

Atty. fees to the
Home To:

•
•
•
•
•
•
D
G
G
D

Furnishings To:
.Automobile To:
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
Restraining Order Entered Against
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $.
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived
Divorce Granted To
As
Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry
• 3-Month Interlocutory
Former Name of

•

Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court
orders
/
shall issue for Deft.
Returnable
.Bail.

G

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

[2

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders
/? Jffln

; -ti£rt

•

Per Month
Alimony Waived

in the amount of

h> ; 7:.

Ct write
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Deferred

. Is Restored
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HLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
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J I M I MITSUNAGA
Attorney for t h e P l a i n t i f f
731 East South Temple S t r e e t
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 410 2
Telephone:

lDOJ

^V^indieyfqieck3,<dist. Couct
$
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H
Deputy deck

(801) 322-3551

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH

KAREN LEHMBERG,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

'

)

Civil No. D82-1770
ELLIS HARDERLIE LEHMBERG,
)

Defendant.
The Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on for
hearing on the 8th day of September, 1983, at the hour
of 2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft,
Judge, and the Plaintiff present in person and
represented by Jimi Mitsunaga- and the Defendant present
in person and represented by Thorn D. Roberts, and the
Court being advised of the premises and upon
stipulation of the parties It Is Hereby Ordered that
the Court is without jurisdiction on Benjamin B. Knowlton
on the issue of the disposition of funds held by
Benjamin B. Knowlton in trust in the above entitled
matter; further, the Plaintiff is awarded a judgment in
the sum of $1,100.65 for arrearages in child support

ADO 3 (

(

'

up to and including August, 1983, and costs of Court in
the amount of $8.35.
DATED this

day of September, 1983.
BY THE COURT:

y- M (\rlyApproved as to form:

Thorn D. Roberts
Attorney for Defenda n t

BRYANT H. CROFT, Jiifrge //
U
AiTEST
"JF^c^Vl^U
\J

Aoo

3*2_

Mr* \nmi Mitsunaga
Attorney at Law
731 Hast South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Sir:
With respect to your recent OSC involving the Lehmbergs, and pursuant to
my records of the trust funds I have held pending the outcome of same,
please be advised that the check I issued to yourself and Karen Lehmberc
was in error. I have noticed as a result of perusing my records that I
was ordered by the court initially to pay for the expenses of repairing
a vehicle then being operated and in the temporary possession of your
client, which was done. The amount of which was $500.00. Said funds
were, issued to Mr. Ellis Lehmberg to accomcdate and fulfill said obligation.
The check I issued you did not reflect that particular deduction of the
trust funds. As a result thereof, and thanking you personally for calling
my attention to same, please find enclosed a check for the appropriate
amount. Also be advised that I have caused a stop payment order lo be
issued on the erroneous check heretofore issued
Yours

truly,

BENJAM]
Attorney

End:

^

r

KNOWLTON
Law

Check

BPK/sk

BEN P. KNOWLTON
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ATTORNEY AT LAW

TRUST ACCOUNT

Sept

22

19 83
31-71/1240

243 EAST 4TH SOUTH SUITE 100 531-0523
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
3

aytothe
order of

. K a r e n Lehmberg:

_

—

—

J $Q884._17__]

Two thousand eight hundred eighty four and 17/100

F(V

First
Interstate
,. Bark
Lehmberg T r u s t

R u t Interatala Bank of Utah
University Oftlca
235 South 1300 Eaat
Salt laka City. Utah 84102
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'that would be held in abeyance and
final ajudication of the matter.

trust, pending
The matter

the

was

before, I believe, Judge Uno who served as a judge pro
tern at the time.

Ellis was present, Karen was

present, I was present and Tom was present; and

also

Benjamin was present.
Q.

Ben

Knowlton?

A-

Excuse me, Benjamin

Q.

Do you remember approximately when

order to show cause hearing

took

that

place?

A.

I don' t have i t .

Q.

Would May of 1982 sound approximately

A.

Probably

right.

Indicate that the Court
held

Knowlton.

in

trust, and

acknowledged

At that

indicated

at

that

--

time, I might

that the money be

time

Dave

Knowlton

that that would be the case pending

the

final ajudication of the matter.
Q.

And how did Mr. Knowlton

A.

I believe

acknowledge

that?

he will hold

it until

that

the words were that, yes,

the Court makes a decision.

MR. ROBERTS: I object and move to strike
°n the basis of the best evidence, that there would
be

a transcript available

to the district

that -- any and all statements

court of

70
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BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q.

2
3

Will you state your name for the

please?

4

A.

D. Aron

5

Q.

And are you an attorney

7

A.

I am.

8

Q.

Are you familiar with

6

9

Stanton.
in the state of

Utah?

Mr. Benjamin

the

Respondent,

Knowltan?

10

A.

I am.

11

Q.

When did you first meet

12

A.

Probably seven years ago, maybe

13

Q.

How how did you happen

15

A.

Hung out

1.6

Q.

During

1.7

with Mr.

18

A.

Yes

19

Q.

How did you know him?

20

A.

We officed

21

Q.

Did there come a time either

14

record

Ben?
eight.

to come to meet

Ben?
together.

1982 and

'83, were you

acquainted

Knowlton?

together.

22

'83 when Mr. Knowlton consulted

23

to a legal matter

involving

in '82 or

with you with

regard

himself?

24

A.

Yes, he did.

25

Q.

And did that have to do, also, with

71
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regard

z

had?

to some monies involving

the Lehmbergs

which,he

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

When did he contact you to the best of

g

your

5
7

information?
A.

According

to my file, would have been

latter part of January because he brought

8

Q.

1983?

9 I

A.

Yes.

Q.

How do you date that?

10
11

was about

the

to me --

How do you know it

then?

12

MS. BURDICK:
for

record.

like to interpose an

13

objection

14

Mr* Stanton has been called out of order and that he

15

needs to go back to his office.

16

as to the attorney's state of mind which I anticipate

17

Mr. Stanton's

18

stage because his intent goes to the severity of the

19

sand:ion, not the technical violation

20

rule.

21

objection

22

would normally ask that

23

after ~the

24

disciplinary

25

sanction hearing

With

the

I would
I

testimony would

panel

makes

rule

Normally,

that

testimony

come in at a sanction

that understanding

to him proceeding

understand

disciplinary

I don't have any

at this point; otherwise I

that
a

violation

testimony wait

until

determination

as

and

then

begins

to
the

portion of the proceedings.

BEVERLY
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MR. KENT: Thank you.
be noted

for the record.

Go ahead and

MR. ROBERTS:
or not I should address

I'm

that.

violation has occurred.

solely for the purpose of

or not an unethical

the objection
Q.

ruled that.

BY MR. ROBERTS: Okay.
that

The question
the contact

the end of January

was

would

1983?

Mr. Knowlton gave me a letter; in fact I

have the original
Jimi Mitsunaga.

that was written by the
It was dated

that advised Mr. Knowlton

that

January

I've never seen the

attorney,

the 26th,

the Lehmberg

MS. BURDICK: Objection;

that's

1983,

matter

--

hearsay.

letter.

MR. KENT: This was a letter
MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Mitsunaga
Mr.

I just

record.

how are you able to identify

A*

introduced

litigation.

for the

have been made toward

to conduct

to have it

MR. KENT: We have not
noted

proceed.

individual's

With regard

rule, I don't want

will

concerned as to whether
This

testimony also goes to whether

evidence

Your objection

from

--

to

Knowlton.
MR. ROBERTS: He did testify he wrote a

letter to Mr. Knowlton and
after

the trial that

informed Mr. Knowlton

right

this was the outcome of the case

73
1

and he wanted

2

the money.
MR. KENT: There was some

3

regarding

4

could be cross-examined

5

allow him

6

that, and Mr. Mitsunaga will be back and

to answer

A.

Which

6

paid

9

the decree of divorce.

in trust

to M r s . Lehmberg

10

Q.

What

11

A.

January

the monies

that

for the Lehmbergs was to b

under

the award by the Court

is the date of that

in

letter?

26, 1983.

letter?
A.

15

Mr. Mitsunaga

16

I have the the original

MS. BURDICK:
into evidence,

18

(Exhibit R-4

19

that

wrote.

17

I prefer

that we put

that

Counsel.

marked)
MR. KENT: Do you have any objection

photocopy being used

to replace

21 J

MS. BURDICK: No

22

MR. KENT: Exhibit

23

and it may be substituted

24

we have a break.

25

that

MS. BURDICK: Do you have a copy of that

14

20

the letter, so we'll

letter stated

Mr. Knowlton held

12

about

the question.

7

13

testimony

n.

the

to a

original?

objection.
R-4 will be

received

for a photocopy as soon as

BY MR. ROBERTS: Did Mr. Knowlton

consult

74
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you with regard

to those

monies?

2 I

A•

Yes, he did.

3

Q*

Did

4

you

do

any

connection with Mr. Knowlton's

5

A.

Yes, I did.

6

Q.

What

7

legal

research

in

position?

issues were you researching

at

that

time?

8

MR. KENT: Excuse me.

9

record,

for the

I don't know if anyone has ever said on the

10

record Mr. Stanton's profession.

11

lay some

12

Q.

foundation

for

Maybe we ought

lawyer.

the State of

I asked

You are authorized

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And you were so in 1982 and

17

A.

Yes .

18

Q.

What

A.

21

attorney's

22

to practice

in

1983?

issues were you researching

connection with those monies of Mr.

20

if you

Utah?

15

19

to

expertise.

BY MR. ROBERTS: I thought

13 I were a Utah
14

Just

Whether

in

Knowlton?

or not he had a legal or

lien on the monies

that he held

in trust

for the Lehmbergs.
I

23
24
25

Q.
of his

What did he indicate

to you was the basis

claim?
A.

He brought me the letter and said,

"I had
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received this letter*

I would like for you to do some

research for me to determine whether or not that the
ral money I hold in trust for the Lehmbergs" -- and he
ml indicated that he had represented both the Lehmbergs
rI

gj-i _- "whether or not if I have any legal -- or if I have
gH a lein on that money for attorney's fees that were due
|H and owing and not paid".
[8

Q*

Did he indicate the nature of those

•9 attorney's fees that were due and owing and unpaid?
5f0

A.

No, he didn' t .

11

Q.

Did he ask you to determine the proper

12

legal course of action for him to take?

13

A.

14 I me
15
16

if

Well, under the standpoint that he asked
he

had

any

legal

right

to

a

lien

on

those monies, yes, and asked me how to go about it.
Q%

You did research and were able to develop

17

an opinion as to what would be an appropriate course

18

of conduct for Mr* Knowlton?

19

A*

Based upon what he told me, yes.

20

Q.

Did you advise him as to that opinion?

21

A.

Yes, I did.

22

Q,

When would you have advised him as to

23

that opinion?

24

A.

It was probably shortly thereafter

25 I because first thing I did, I went to the statute to
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1

determine what constitutes an attorney's lien and the

2

statute itself is clear on the face, based upon the

3

facts of the situation he told me, that he in fact,

4

would have an attorney's lien on that money.

5

Q.

And what did you advise him what actions

6

he could take?

7

A.

Actually, what I did, I just took him a

8

copy of the statute and said here is the statute.

9

That's the law right now and states that you do have a

10

lien upon that money, and whatever your attorney fees

11

are according to the statute, you have an attorney's

12

lien to that money.

13

Q.

Did you indicate whether or not it would

14

be proper for him to take that money at that time

15

based upon that lien?

16
17
18
19

A.

No, I didn't.

Maybe by inuendo I did,

but I didn't say you have a right.
Q.

Did you indicate what action he would

have to take to further perfect his attorney lien?

20

A.

No, I didn't.

21

Q.

Did you discuss the possibility of filing

22

an at-torney lien on himself since he was the holder of

23

the monies?

24

A.

No, I didn't.

25

Q.

Did he compensate you for that advice?
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A.

Ellis Haderly Lehmberg.

Q.

And do you know Mr. Benjamine Knowlton

A•

Yes, I do.

Q.

How long have you known him?

A.

2 5 years .

Q.

Did he help out in connection with the

here?

sale of a house which you owned in legal title with
your wife Karen Lehmberg's parents back in 1982?
A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

Had he represented you on other matters

prior to that time?
A•

Yes >

Q.

What type of matters?

A.

Lawsuits, back child support, speeding

tickets *
Q.

Were there -- at the time the house was

sold, did you owe Ben a lot of money for lawyer's
fees?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Did you ever add it up personally

yourself prior to that time how much you would have
owed him?
A.
lot of it.

Yes, I just put it together in my head, a
It was around four, five, six, seven

1T6
1

the monies that were being held by Mr. Knowlton.

2
3

Q.

the court when this was

4

A.

5

circular

6

Justice*

7

Q.

8

Where was Mr. Knowlton with proximity to

you can

9

discussed?

He was on the the first
court

row in the

rooms in the Metropolitan Hall of

What was said,

if anything, as near as

recall?

A.

There was a concern as to the

existence

10

and nature of those monies, and

if they were were

11

being held by Mr. Knowlton since Mr. Mitsunaga,

12

behalf

13

orders, restrainig

14

funds.

of his client was seeking mutual

15

the parties

I made reference

16

appearance

in the court

17

was made to the fact

18

trust

room.

that

of

those

Knowlton's

He stood up;

he was holding

reference

them

in a

account.

19

Q.

What

20

A.

Would have been something

if anything did Mr. Knowlton

21

of, "Yes, your Honor.

22

nature of recognition

23

did have the monies

24 I

restraining

from disposing

to Mr.

on

Q.

25 I Mr. Knowlton

Did

Yes, I do."

to the effect

It was more of a

that he was a lawyer;

that we had been talking

Judge

Uno

to do anything

direct
in any

say?

or

regard?

that

he

about.

order
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1

A*

He did not.

2

Q.

At that time or any other time in this

3

divorce

4

proceeding?

A.

He did not.

rotational

system.

6

involvement

with the case, and I don't know of any

7

I'm

8

Mr. Knowlton

9

determination binding on Mr. Knowlton during

10
11

aware

of

to

think

any

do

that

the old

5

not

I

That was under

other

anything,

judge
or

Q.

In fact, after

13

the divorce decree, an order

14

upon Mr. Knowlton;

17
18
19
20
21
22

only
—

directing

making

any

the divorce was

by way of the divorce decree and/or

16

his

those

proceedings.

12

15

was

A.

is that

resolved

the amendment

to

to show cause was served

correct?

He was served with an order

to show

cause.
Q.
Relations
A.

Was that to appear before the
Commissioner?
It was initially styled

However, he was directed
Q.

Domestic

to 3*udge

that

Croft.

And that was because of your

with the Domestic Relations

way.

conflict

Commissioner?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

"She" being your wife,

25

A.

Back then, she was only my client.

correct?
No
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1

I was aware previous

to that

that

2

Mr. Knowlton had a claim

3

connection with having or perfecting

4

interest

and/or

5

opposed

to

6

connection with his assertion with

7

attorney

8

my client

9

to the rendition of a divorce decree and the vesting

immediate

any

other

claim
that

dated January

of

interest

11

Mr. and M r s . Lehmberg
Q.

in

to

to M r s .

a security

would

27 prior

and

fees in

to these monies as

lein, which I reflected

10

12

any

for attorney's

time

come

about

the claim

in

for an

by correspondence

to

to -- 1983 -- prior

the

money

as between

Lehmberg.

Are you telling us, Mr. Roberts -- prior

13

to the divorce decree being

entered,

to your

14

did Mr. Ben Knowlton claim an interest

15

funds in question?

knowledge

in the

specific

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

When?

18

A.

Based upon my letter dated January 27,

19

1983, it would have been that day or the day before,

20

because that

21

had with Mr. Knowlton

22

the attorney's

23

letter to Mr.

24 I

letter was sent after a conversation I
in his office where we discussed

lein which

I make reference

to in my

Lehmberg.
MR. GALLEGOS: That

25 | tells you that he's claiming

is when Ben

an interest

first

in this

I
1
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BY MR. ROBERTS:

2

Q.

State your name

for the record,

3

A*

Benjamin Peter

4 I

Q.

And are you an attorney

Knowlton.
licensed

5

practice

6

A.

Yes,I

7

Q.

How long have you been licensed

8

State of Utah?

9

A•

Since 1981.

10

Q.

Are you licensed

11

licensed

12

A.

Yes, I have.

13

Q.

What

14

A.

State of California

15

Q.

Are you acquainted

16

Mr. Ellis

am.

in any other

jurisdictions?

jurisdictions and when?
1980.
and familiar with a

Lehmberg?
Yes , I am.

18

Q.

How long have you known him?

19

A.

Since approximately

21 I

6 1 ; somewhere
Q.

in the

or have you been

A.

f

to

law in the State of Utah?

17

20

please.

1962, I guess, or

in there.

Subsequent

to your becoming a lawyer in

22

the State of Utah, did you act on his behalf as an

23

attorney?

24

A.

Yes, I have.

25

Q.

Prior to May of 1982, which was when th
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1

divorce

was

initiated,

2

representation of Mr. Ellis

3

A.

Yes, I did.

4

Q.

What

5

concerning;

had

you

done

substantial

Lehmberg?

types of cases did you represent

general, civil,

criminal?

him

6

A.

Both civil and

criminal.

7

Q.

Had you, prior

to May of 1982, received

8

much payment

for legal

fees?

9

A.

May of

10

Q.

Yes.

11

A.

Prior to May?

12

Q.

Yes.

13

A.

I!m

14

1982?

not sure I know how to answer

question.

15

Q.

In April of 1982, did you represent

16

assist Mr. Lehmberg

17

residence?
A.

Yes, I did.

19

Q.

When and what were the

under which you first became

21

A.

and

in connection with the sale of a

18

20

that

Mr. Lehmberg

circumstances

involved

approached

that was pending

in doing
me and

that?

notified

22

me of a foreclosure

on his and

23

Karen's house, the trustee sale had been noticed

24

Was scheduled

25

April

up.

for sale -- trustee sale 20th day of

1982 at the hour of 10

0,clock.
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1
2

A.

It's Exhibit

P-4 and what has been

MS. BURDICK:

If we are we going

as R - 8 .

3
4

any further

5

I'd

testimony with respect

to some

Q.
listed

8

those funds directly

9

connection with the

in the settlement

from the title company

Are you referring

11

Q.

Yes.

12

A.

I did.

13

Q.

And what were those funds for?

to the

fees were those funds

A.

For negotiating

and also handling

the creditors and what

18

owing at that

time from Mr.

19

A.

Yes, there were.

20

Q.

And this 2,000 attorney's

22

Were there other attorney's

payment

A.

23
24
25

$2,000?

Exhibit

fees did not
--

for the admission of

8.

MR. KENT: Any

fees due and

not.

MR. ROBERTS: I move
Respondent's

not.

Lehmberg?

toward any of those past

No, they did

What

the sale of the house,

Q.

reflect

in

for?

17

21

receive

closing?

A.

attorney's

fees

to be paid, did you

10

16

foundation,

BY MR. ROBERTS: The attorney's

7

15

to have

like to see it, please.

6

14

marked

objection?
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1

MS- BURDICK: No

2

MR. KENT: R-8 will be

3
4

Q.
you

received.

BY MR. ROBERTS: In April of 1982, had

told

and/or

5 I Mr. Lehmberg
6

objection.

prepared

a

written

No, not as of that

8

Q.

Had you kept him advised

date.

attorney's

fees that he had

A.

No.

12

Q.

At that

13

own mind

14

time?

15

on

the amount

A.

incurred and had owed

time, did you estimate

Well, approximately,

didn't maintain a billing

17

that

18

I handled

19

it necessary

20

time.

information*

system

I had an idea.
that would

I

reference

for him, and I didn't

to try any itemization until

When you received

Plaintiff's

22 I the proceeds check,

the

23

Mrs. Lehmberg

you with regard

24

should do with those
A.

that

Ellis and I were close friends and

a lot of matters

Q.

you?

in your

that was due and owing at

16

25

in writing

the ongoing nature of your relationship as to the

11

21

and

owing to you?
A.

10

to

of all the fees that were outstanding

7

9

statement

direct

remaining

funds?

No, she did

not.

later

find
in

Exhibit

$5599.95,
to anything

4,

did
you
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1

Q.

Did you have any conversation

--

2

A.

No, wait a minute, do you mean Mrs. Ellis

3

Lehmberg

4

Q.

Yes.

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Other than this check, were there any

here?

7

other written documents

8

setting

9

with respect

that you ever

received

forth any terms and conditions of any

trust

to these monies?

10

A.

No, there were no written

11

Q.

Did Alta Title Company

12

directions with respect

13

connection with those

documents.

make any

expressed

to your actions as trustee in

funds?

14

A.

No, they did

15

Q.

When did you first become aware of the

16
17

not.

pendency of the divorce between Ellis and

Karen

Lehmberg?

18

A.

I'm not certain of the date, but

I think

19

it was just shortly after Ellis was served with a

20

summons

21

become aware of it before Ellis, because

22

had a conversation with Karen regarding

23

recall

24
25

and complaint;

but

then again, I may have
I may have
it.

I don't

exactly.
Q.

Did you ever enter an appearance of

counsel on behalf of Mr. Lehmberg

in that

divorce
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1

case?

2

A.

I don't believe

3

Q*

I believe that you went over to the

4

courthouse

5

show cause; do you recall

6
7

A.
Mr.

I ever did, no.

in connection with the original orders to
that?

Well, I recall going over with you and

Lehmberg.

8

Q.

What was the reason you went over

9

A.

Well, Ellis was a friend of mine and so

10

was Karen and so were you, and you were across

11

street

12

didn't have anything better

13

with you•

14

there?

the

in my office as I recall, discussing, it and I

Q.

15

any

16

proceeding?

to do so I walked

over

You of course, have not been served

documents

and

you

were

17

A.

That

18

Q.

While you were

with

not a party to that

is correct.
in the courtroom,

19

judge, to your knowledge and understanding,

20

order with respect

21

might have of either Ellis or Karen

to you and any monies

did

make any

that

you

Lehmberg?

22

A.

To the best, of my recollection,

23

Q.

What did he say?

24 I

A.

Well, as I recall, I think it was you

25 | that

indicated

to

the

judge

the

that

I

was

yes.

in the
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1

courtroom and I stood up and he said "Mr. Knowlton are

2

you holding any of these parties funds in trust?" and

3

I said, "Yes", and he said, "Are you adverse to

4

spending -- or making available some funds to repair

5

Karen's car so Ellis could have his car?"

6

"No, I'm not adverse to that." and my impression -- or

7

at least that he told me then to go ahead and do it.
Q.

8
9

and I said

Did you subsequently release some of

those funds to Mr. Lehmberg?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

How much did you release?

12

A.

Well, I initially thought I had released

1 O
•*• s*

14

$500, but in going through the records, apparently I
released $600 for the purpose of repairing the car or

15 . one of the cars so Karen could have that car so she
16

would release Ellis' car.

17

of it.

18
19

That was my understanding

I believe that's reflected in a statement.
Q.

I show you the third page of Plaintiff's

Exhibit 5.

20

A.

Yes

21

Q.

Is that the $600 you're making reference

23

A.

Yes .

24

Q.

Were you aware of settlement

22

25

to?

negotiations

prior to January 25th, 1983 between Mr. Mitsunaga and
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1

myself

in connection with those

monies?

2

A.

Not with any sufficient

3

Q.

Did you, prior

particularity.

to January

25th, 1983 the

4

date of the hearing or the date of the trial

5

Lehmberg's

6

interest

7

had in your

divorce, believe you had any

I did.

9

Q.

And what was the basis

you had an interest

12

A.

13 J I guess
14

few —

for that

Number

legal services

1, I had

monies?

performed

for Ellis and

peripheral!

fo,r Karen on several matters; karen just a
two of them that I can think of.

15

Secondly,
just prior

I had,

money

17

date of the filing of the divorce, and

18

payment was forthcoming

19

recall, Ellis had even suggested

20

filing of this divorce.
Q.

22 I occasion

to., and all

in fact,

16

21

belief

in and to those specific

Twofold.

considerable

that you

account?

A.

11

specific

in and to those particular monies

8

10

in the

loaned

this was prior

from those

to the

I assumed

that

funds, and as I

that prior to the

Did there also come a time when you had
to contact

Mr. Dan

Stanton?

23 |

A.

Yes, there w a s .

24 |

Q.

Do you have any idea of when that

25 I have

Ellis

been?

would

L51
considered
friend.

Karen a friend and I considered

That's why I wouldn't

represent

them in hairy divorce; matter of fact,
them back

either one of

I tried

not merely as a lawyer,

I guess as a lawyer and as a friend,

to take all

that

this money and put an attorney's

it and prevail on keeping
was to go to the benefit

if I was
lien on

all the money, most of it
of Ellis Lehmberg,

because of the majority of legal problems
undertaken

to get

together.
I was concerned,

but

Ellis a

and

that

the representations were primarily

I had
for

Ellis.
The majority

-- I will say, that as I

recall of the judgments and the liens that
to get satisfied
fact

I had

tried

for 50 cents on the dollar, were in

incurred by Ellis, not by Karen; so I thought

was unfair

to try and chastize Karen.

in the wrong place in making

and compromise.

I'm

that kind of decision.

So, at any rate, I tried
settlement

Now, maybe

it

to make a

I sat down and I thought

"Well, yeah Ellis, owes you a bunch of money and
that's

true, but on the other hand, why should

have to pay for it now they're

involved

So I tried to settle

it.

Karen

in a divorce? 11
I thought

$2500 isn't very much but why not send her

the

^, /
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1

balance, and so I tendered

2

said,

3

and give

4

Q.

How did you arrive at the figure of

A,

$2500, I d o n f t

5

the balance of it and I

"All right, Jimi, here; why don't you take
it to Karen".

$2500?

6
7

Ellis.

8

about

9

with the money

I don't know.
it.

know.

He and

I suggested

Just

talking

I kind of just

different

11

It's just a matter of paying me back certain

12

that

13

tell you the truth.

15

Q.
the sum of

things before they ever filed

him.

Yes.

17

Q.

Is that

taking -- deducting

293, that

the

Yes.

20

Q.

Did you deliver

A.

I don't know

personally, or if I mailed

24

to him.
Q.

after

that personally

to Jimi,

recall?

23

25

for

$2500?

A.

22

funds

first check

the balance you figured

19

or do you

for divorce.

$3384?

A.

21

for

Plus — I don't know why, to

Check number

16

18

chatted

I lent him out of my back pocket

I had advanced

to

this, and a lot of it has to do

10

14

this

if I delivered
it.

it

Seems like I mailed

You then made an accounting

based

upon

it
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A.

1
2

trial.

Oh, I was thinking about
Now, would you please

rephrase your

3

Q.

Did you appear at that

4

A.

No, I did not.

5

Q.

question?

trial?

I appeared at the

pre-trial when the trial got

6

the divorce

continued.

Were you present

during

the discussion

7

between Mr. Mitsunaga, your counsel Dave Knowlton,

8

the judge with regard to the

9
10

issues?

A.

I was in the hallway,

outside his

chamber

Q.

Why didn't you appear at the time of

A.

Well, for the reason specified

door .

11
12

and

trial?

13

here.

I was in Alaska.

in my

14

affidavit

I assumed

15

was going to be continued.

16

sole purpose of securing

17

I was in Alaska.

18

automobile, and I wasn't

19

quite a ways from there, and when I found out

20

matter wasn't going

21

think I called my brother David and asked him about

22

and he said,

23

somebody

24

you," and so I assumed

25

and

It was continued

the trial
for the

the deposition of Ellis, and

I was not -- couldn't get back by
exactly

in Fairbanks.

to be continued

"As long as Ellis

I was
the

or something, I
it

is here and we get

to put on the defense, we really don't

need

everything was going to go fine

found out it didn't,

unfortunately.
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1

evidence

that you would have presented

2

that amount was, in fact.

to show what

3

A.

Nobody has asked me

4

Q.

I think that question has been asked,

5

if you have something,

6

A.

that.

let's hear

I did not make

7

time, all right?

8

that was my money.

9

any problem anyway, because

it now, perhaps.

this calculation

I knew that a substantial
I didn't

but

anticipate
I wasn't

at

that

amount

of

there would be

breaching

any of

10

the terms and condition of trustee, and Ellis owed me

11

a

12

reservations

13

receive, and so I sat back and

substantial

14

amount

of

money,

and

so

I

about how much or if any, Karen

should

waited.

Later on when it became apparent

15

were going

16

with the figure of, looks like 7550, but

17

include some other

18

for another -- other monies

19

Ellis's behalf back in March.

20

to court

Q.

I tallied

A.

that

I would guess about

that

I had spent

it to us at any

Not that complete.

in

24

you an amount which is I think -- I have

of

time?

I can give you

dates,

I can give you the case numbers, and

$80 an hour.

350

So --

23

25 I this on about

didn't

to ask for an itemization

21 J that 7550, could you give
22 I

that we

it up and I came out

funds which

If I were

had

the

I can give

predicated

11

disciplinary

rule

violations.

MR. ROBERTS:
MR. KENT:

Okay.

Okay.

guess, at your disposal.
with

the sanction

prepared

If you would

like to proceed

stage of the proceedings, we are

to do that.

brief recess

We are, at this time, I

If you would

and discuss

like to take a

things, we are

certainly

happy to do that, too.
M S . BURDICK:
an opportunity
that

We are suggesting

to consent

if you want

to.

MR. KENT:

And

to discipline.
I'd

be happy

giving

you

We can do

to do that.

We will go off the record

for a

minute .
(Discussion

off the

Back on the record.
everyone
proceed

is back
at this

sanctions

phase.

uncertainty
somewhat

that

the brief recess,

How do you wish

to

time?

a reputation

we have somewhat

After

in place here.

MR. ROBERTS:
developing

record)

W e l l , at the risk of
that I never

of a stipulation
There

with

is a certain

I have, and

shares that with

let the case die,
regard

amount

I think Miss

respect

to the

of

Berry

to the findings, or

the conclusions as to this violation, but we would
willing

to stipulate

REBECCA

JANKE —

as follows:
CAPITOL

REPORTERS

be

12

1

That

if your

2

dishonesty

3

evil or improper

4

it was actual bad

5

money/

finding

by the conversion

was based

faith

MS. BURDICK:

sanction

8

relying

9

which

of course

10

issue

in terms of mitigation

11

his state of mind was in committing

12

that violated

would

to dishonesty

where he was

is not our position/

be --

in good

faith

first/ that he took

17

or aggravation/

Okay.

it with

M S . BURDICK:
wrongfulness

but that's

lien/
the

is what

that dishonest

act

the rule.

MR. ROBERTS:

15

if

of the

on advice that he had a valid attorney's

13

MS. SUMNER;
think

that that

19

that what we were

20

probably

21

negligence.

22

members.

23

d iscuss

So # assuming

intent

it was the

--

The knowledge

of the taking

18

of the

--

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I don't

is what we were thinking.
thinking

is that

I think

it 'was a situation

more like unto negligence, but probably
And we can hear

I don't

from

the other

gross

panel

see any reason why we can't

openly

tha t.

24
25

actual

And before you go on to that/

as opposed

16

upon

in terms of the taking

7

14

of

intent on Mr. Knowlton's behalf/

then an appropriate

6

of violation

MR. KENT:
regarding

that

We specifically

issue because

made no

the point

finding

in determining

